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The Effective Altruism (EA) movement stresses cost-effective philanthropy over carelessly 
throwing effort or money behind any old cause. It is motivated by the laudable, selfless desire to 
maximise global happiness. It might have been called ‘Consequential Altruism’ or even 
‘Consequentialist Altruism’: it demands that any intervention be judged not by its deontology nor 
by the agent’s virtue or otherwise, but by its consequences, its effectiveness. EA thus inherits many 
of the problems that many readers of this journal will be familiar with in Consequentialism as a 
moral philosophy. 
Whilst I deeply admire the motivations behind the movement, and recognise that well-targeted 
individual giving certainly can have demonstrable positive effects, EA falls far short of offering a 
solution to global poverty, let alone to still-bigger questions of global politics and ecology — or to 
questions of how to choose to live, the true questions of ethics. In its quest for quantification, EA 
tends to overlook key, foundational areas of concern - perhaps most notably dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change - and fails to appreciate the fundamental role of global political-
economy in the issues it seeks to address. 
The consideration by Peter Singer and William MacAskill in their recent books of anthropogenic 
climate change throws these doubts about EA into sharp relief. Start with MacAskill. In an 
important chapter of his book entitled ‘Poverty vs climate change vs …’, MacAskill seeks to 
compare various causes and their scale, level of neglect and tractability. Of ‘2-4 degrees of climate 
change’, he writes that its scale as a problem is ‘fairly large’; the same level of scale he assigns to 
the issue of ‘US criminal justice reform’. This is a catastrophic under-estimation, as it would take 
very little effort to show. 4 degrees of climate change would mean the end of the world as we know 
it; it would involve heat-waves in large land-masses for instance at 10 to 12 degrees centigrade 
above the hottest levels current. Of course, we don’t know just how bad it would be; it could be 
much worse than this (or less bad). It’s not measurable in the way that EA prefers things to be 
measurable. And it involves a constitutive time-lag; by the time the climate threat is fully 
measurable, it will be too late to stop it. 
Now take Singer, who writes (emphasis added): 
[C]ompare climate change and malaria. On the basis of what the overwhelming majority of 
scientists in the [field] tell us, the need for an international agreement to reduce greenhouse 
gases is extremely urgent. There are, however, already many governments and organisations 
working toward getting such an agreement. It is difficult for private donors to be confident that 
anything they can do will make that agreement more likely. In contrast, distributing mosquito 
  
nets to protect children from malaria is, at least from a global perspective, less urgent, but 
individuals can more easily make a difference to the number of nets distributed. 
Singer’s conclusion: tackle malaria, leave climate change to governments. This again is an epic fail 
(as well as a truly perplexing thing for a former Australian Green Party senate candidate to say). 
Notice the way that what one can be confident of skews Singer’s answer (and skewers the future). 
We can more easily show the number of mosquito nets distributed. Therefore, we should give to 
charities distributing mosquito nets, and give up trying to influence the too-big-to-succeed issue of 
climate. We can bask in the confidence that ‘already many governments and organisations [are] 
working toward [an international climate change] agreement’. Ignore the fact that Paris, the 
‘successful’ international agreement that we now have, relies on non-existent negative-emissions 
technologies, barely mentions renewables or fossil fuels, doesn’t mention animal agriculture or the 
vast downsides of large-scale agrofuels, commits us, even on its own terms, to 3-4 degrees of global 
over-heat, and has literally no enforcement mechanisms.  
The complacency of Singer’s response to probably the greatest issue of our time makes one worry 
about what the effects of ‘Effective Altruism’ may actually be ... The climate issue is determinative; 
it will either make possible or utterly undermine effective action on a host of other issues. The key 
methodological flaw here, and one that is common to much of EA, is the elision of ‘effectiveness’ 
with ‘evidence-based’. It makes the EA methodology little better than the infamous drunk looking 
for his car keys where the streetlight happens to be shining. Lack of certainty should not be a reason 
to delay strong precautious action in the face of potential catastrophe; but EA cannot take the 
Precautionary Principle seriously, because of the dogmatic EA insistence upon evidence. 
Focussing largely on health in the way that most EA does (a focus explicitly defended in 
MacAskill’s book) is also hopelessly short-sighted, catastrophically so. EA largely occludes the 
systemic threats bearing down on us in favour of more visibly ‘effective’ interventions ultimately 
conceived of as interventions by individuals to help individuals. Consequently, EA tends to boil 
down largely to relatively short-term/manageable projects. (Life-projects are discussed, and I will 
come to this in a moment; but of course these are bound to be far harder to ‘measure’.) Activities 
with long-term consequences tend to be eschewed in favour of such short-term projects. Failing to 
award climate change the premier global threat status it deserves, on the grounds of its being 
calculus-unfriendly, represents a grave discrimination against future generations. But perhaps this 
tacit ‘moral future discount rate’ is not entirely unexpected from a utilitarian model that is closely 
linked to classical economic theory. 
Dealing only with extreme poverty as it exists now boils down to storing up a constant stream of 
emergent destitution into the future, rather than tackling its root causes. If philanthropy is solely 
focussed on the most egregious manifestation of symptoms, then the underlying causes are allowed 
to fester and intensify. EA’s fixation on the symptoms creates the impression that they arise 
spontaneously, and are not reflective of structural problems of the neoliberal socio-economic 
imaginary. In fact, geo-political and historical forces are chief causes of ongoing poverty in the 
Global South. Whether we are talking about land grabs, toxic waste dumping, labour and consumer 
exploitation from Western multinationals, massive environmental degradation, health impacts of 
resource plundering, local government corruption, ongoing regional conflicts, and the escalating 
  
environmental consequences of Western economic activity, all of these deep causes of poverty are 
unresolvable through scientistic philanthropy and single-issue projects. They require a deeper 
(philosophical) look, and a harder (political) struggle. MacAskill’s defence of carbon-offsetting as 
an allegedly affordable, allegedly potentially effective way for caring Western individuals to help 
deal with the climate crisis evinces an almost total failure to be willing to take such a look. 
The point is that most of the causes of deep poverty (including, strikingly, anthropogenic climate 
change) are structural and can therefore only hope to be alleviated through systemic measures — 
which is where (global) politics comes in. Such systemic thinking is what (real) politics is all about. 
But being wholistic in one’s approach, unfortunately, seems in practice inimical to the EA 
approach, which is necessarily balkanised because of its ‘evidence-based’ nature. Singer in 
particular focuses almost exclusively on charity (i.e. on charities), and virtually ignores the bigger 
frame: political change. 
At this point an EA-advocate would doubtless say that we should have an ‘evidence-based politics’. 
Yet, while it is true that it would be a good thing for evidence to be less blithely ignored in politics, 
it would be a depoliticising disaster to substitute ‘evidence-based politics’ for real politics. Many of 
the problems we face are rooted in systematic uncertainties, the type of which evidence alone 
cannot possibly deal with effectively. Any need whose causes or solutions are complex or political is 
thus likely to come out badly from an EA approach. In this sense, it is not only the case that, say, 
love and fellow-feeling (as opposed to the spirit of calculation) are important dimensions missing 
from the EA analysis, but that there are also 'harder' political dimensions that EA systematically 
misses. For example, if responsibility for sharing the 'burden' of refugees were more equitably 
shared then the political incentives to address the underlying drivers of displacement would be 
likely to increase - though not certainly so: there might be a political reaction instead, à la UKIP / 
Trump - regardless of how much fellow-feeling there was or is. 
Perhaps the most crucial political lack in EA is its tendency not to question the overarching 
political-economic frame of (neo-)liberal capitalist individualism. Singer’s defence of capitalism on 
the grounds that it increases wealth misunderstands the grave consequences of inequality (on which, 
see Wilkinson and Pickett’s 2010 book The Spirit Level); he ignores the value of community or 
society in itself. Instead, he likes a system which ‘increases the ability of the rich to help the poor, 
and some of the world’s richest people, including Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, have done 
precisely that, becoming, in terms of the amount of money given, the greatest effective altruists in 
human history.’ Never mind that such wealth massively suborns democracy, nor that such 
inequality is intrinsically harmful. 
Similarly, consider MacAskill’s extraordinary support for the unbelievable level of inequality 
involved in what we allow to accrue to entrepreneurs: quoting ultra-neo-classicist William 
Nordhaus favourably, MacAskill praises entrepreneurs for allegedly generating $50 for society for 
every $1 they take themselves. The conventionality of MacAskill’s economics is matched by the 
conventionality of his admiration for ‘conventional’ (sic) agriculture – that is, for industrialised 
agriculture dependent on pesticides, artificial fertilisers etc.; agriculture that is leading toward a 
situation in which we have about two generations worth only of soil left. MacAskill attacks the 
movement for local food, and issues ill-informed calls to substitute foreign-grown tomatoes for 
  
home-grown ones, ignoring the possibility of a system-change which would, for instance, once 
more re-centre our food-production on what is seasonably growable, where we live. He signs up 
uncritically to an agenda of ‘developmentality’, looking forward to the replacement of agrarian 
societies by a ‘universal’ mode of industrial growth.  
If this perhaps allows us to understand better why it is impossible for the likes of MacAskill to get 
the threat and causes of human-induced dangerous climate-change into focus, it also makes it easier 
to understand how he can make the extraordinary claim that sweatshops are the most humane form 
of employment for many people in the ‘3rd world’. His ‘1st-world’ narrow-mindedness cannot 
conceive of any other future for most people in the world than that set out by the path of the 
industrial revolution. He quotes standard pro-growth economists of capitalism such as Krugman and 
Sachs singing hymns of praise to standard industrial-growth pathways in general and to sweatshops 
in particular. The idea that people in ‘developing countries’ might conceivably have been sold a 
false prospectus about what life in the cities is like - or real alternative possibilities such as a 
Gandhian culture of self-reliance, or outright political revolution - simply do not get a look-in. Nor, 
of course, once again, does the straight line between industrial growthism and looming climatic 
cataclysm. 
The extent to which EA is thoroughly in hock to something remarkably akin to the standard 
capitalist industrial-growth model perhaps helps to explain also something EA has become famous 
for: recommending many people to take high-earning jobs in business or finance and give away 
much of their earnings to charity. The consequences of the career-consequentialism of EA are more 
startlingly visible still at a revealing moment in Singer’s book, when he writes that ‘on a plausible 
reading of the relevant facts, at least some of the guards at Auschwitz were not acting wrongly’, for 
nastier people still would have taken their places, if they hadn’t nobly stepped forward to kill Jews 
‘humanely’… We see at a moment like this the depths to which the logic of the lesser evil - the 
logic of consequentialism, the logic of EA - will take one. It seems a long journey, from the utopian 
aspirations of EA to an apologia for serving as a Nazi guard at Auschwitz. But, for one who accepts 
the logic of EA, it is apparently no distance at all.  
It is admirable to be willing to break social norms to improve the lot of other beings. It is 
encouraging that significant numbers of people now are willing to give selflessly and systematically 
to others far away, and that they care enough to work to check that their money is used effectively. 
It is to be welcomed that a group of people are thinking about how to be altruistic, and how to be 
effective, and that a much larger group of people are literally buying into that thinking. And for 
comparing the effectiveness of a few commensurable charities, EA is, as I have said, of use. 
Yet, at the very least, there needs to be far more thinking here on the relationship between effective 
altruism and effective democracy. Developing the example that I touched on above, let us close by 
noting that rich people can choose what they give to. Bill and Melinda Gates are not technology-
neutral: their charitable work focuses on techno-fixes and ignores anthropogenic climate change. 
Indeed, its only major climate-change dimension, very worryingly, is Gates’s great interest in 
buying up geo-engineering patents! I am not encouraged by MacAskill’s warm words for those 
looking into geo-engineering. It is alarming that MacAskill seems almost to pass over what is by far 
the most vital element of the climate issue - namely, cutting down on our GHG-pollution of the 
  
atmosphere - in favour of carbon offsets on the one hand and reckless technophiliac enthusiasm for 
geo-engineering on the other. Doing good better? I think that philosophy can help us do much better 
than this. 
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